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Abstract
Trust is indispensable to duciary elds (e.g., credit rating), where experts exer-
cise wide discretion on others behalf. Can the shame from scandal sort trustworthy
people out of a duciary eld? I tested for the possibility in a charitable contribution
game where subjects could be "ungenerous" when unobserved. After establishing that
"generosity" required a contribution of more than $6, subjects were given the choice of
contributing either $5 publicly or $0-$10 privately. Almost all control subjects chose to
contribute privately less than $2. The majority of treatment subjects, after being told
the prediction that they were unlikely to contribute more than $2, if they contributed
privately, contributed $5 publicly. This suggests that the mere belief that a subject
would exploit the greater discretion and unobservability of a duciary-like position can
deter entry into such a position. Thus, scandals that create such a belief could repel
shame-sensitive people from that eld possibly to the detriment of the eld and the
economy as a whole. The shame externality of a scandals on private judgments may
also been seen in politically correct speech after demonstrated racial prejudice of others.
JEL Codes: C91, C72, H41, H42
Keywords: shame, psychological game theory, beliefs preferences, charitable con-
tributions game, duciary
Acknowledgement 1 I would like to thank Giacomo Bonanno, Klaus Nehring and
Burkhard Schipper for their advising. I would also like to thank Richard Robins, Guido
Kuersteiner, Scott Carell, Travis Lybbert, Doug Miller, Chris Knittel, Yoonie Chung,
Scott Niven, Will Ambrosini, Matthew Pearson, Santiago Buccaran, Olena Sloan, and
Peking University HSBC School of Business starting fall 2009
1
Je¤ery Graham for their feedback on various parts of the writing, as well as the partic-
ipants of the Applied Micro Brownbag.
1 Introduction
President Obama called Wall Street bankers shameful for giving themselves
nearly $20 billion in bonuses as the economy deteriorated and the government
spent billions to bail out some of the nations most prominent nancial institu-
tions. [Stolberg and Labaton, 2009]
Id almost rather say Im a pornographer,said a retired Wall Street executive.
[Segal, 2009].
Trust is indispensable to duciary elds, where experts exercise wide discretion according
to unobservable, subjective judgments. Clients of doctors, dentists, credit rating agencies,
investment bankers, clergy, accountants...teachers need to trust the duciary for the same
reason that they need their services lack of expertise. An unmeasured (to my knowledge)
consequence of recent scandals among nancial duciaries is that persons most sensitive
to shame might avoid scandalized tasks, leave, or never enter the profession. They may
opt for non-duciary work where they are fully observed, and therefore, will be rewarded
for moral behavior, instead of duciary work, where they are unobserved but suspected of
immoral behavior due to the taint of scandal. If shame sensitivity positively correlates with
trustworthiness, scandals could do grave damage to a profession and make future scandals
even more likely by causing trustworthy people to exit and untrustworthy people to enter 1.
Though the issue of whether the shame from a scandal can sort people in duciary elds
is an empirical question, shame aversion is not measured in job interviews. And, even if it
were, since we want to measure the sorting power of shame, we would want to measure those
people who would have but did not apply for the job. Thus, to see if scandals can sort, a
controlled experiment is required.
[Tadelis, 2007] established experimentally that betrayals of trust can be deterred by the
threat ofmere observation of that betrayal : shame. However, whether the suspicion incited by
others shameful actions when unobserved could deter a person from entering into a similar
1Shame may have sorted the more trustworthy people out of:
1. Accounting after the indictment of Arthur Andersen.
2. Credit rating agencies after the conict of interest scandals associated withe the internet stocks bubble.
3. Politics after a major corruption scandal.
4. The Catholic clergy after the pedophilia scandal.
5. The mortgage lending business after the recent subprime mortgage crisis.
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unobserved situation has yet to be addressed. This is what is tested in the following public
contribution game where shame is induced by the belief that one will be ungenerous when
unobserved.
36 subjects spent about 20 minutes lling out a 50 question psychological test which
they were told was to predict their likely level of generosity to a famous charity. After they
revealed that generosity required a contribution of more than $6 of the $10 they would
earn, they were given the choice of contributing either $5 publicly or $0-$10 privately. 9
10
of
control subjects contributed privately, less than $2. 10
26
of treatment subjects contributed $5
publicly, after being told that given their low test scores, they were unlikely to contribute
more than $2, if they contributed privately. The level of signicance for the treatment was
9%. The increased willingness to pay to seem generous suggests that the mere belief that a
subject might exploit the wide discretion and unobservability (e.g., give $0-$10 unobserved)
of a duciary like position can deter entry into such a position. Thus, scandals which create
such beliefs could change a duciary eld by repelling shame-sensitive people possibly to
the detriment of the eld and the economy as a whole, if shame sensitivity is positively
correlated with trustworthiness. This result that shame can sort people out of situations in
which they might exploit moral hazard is consistent with the predictions of the pooling and
separating equilibria of [Ong, 2008a]2. To my knowledge, there are no other papers on belief
or shame externalities.
There are broader applications for this notion of shame externality since subjective judg-
ments are ubiquitous, for instance, in hiring and promotion decisions by managers3. Scan-
dalous prejudicial hiring practices can impose a belief externality on similar unobservable
subjective judgments, which may result in public but suboptimal actions or appeasing speech
acts political correctness4.
The psychology literature has focused upon measuring shame, but not its externalities.
See [Tracy et. al, 2007] for a recent compilation of signicant research in psychology.
This paper is also relevant to the debate on whether people act altruisticaly because of
moral preferences, or as posited here, due to preferences over the beliefs of others. The
treatment announcement in my experiment, "According to our past experience,..." was un-
informative of anything other than beliefs. Subjects had been given full information about
their possible choices and payo¤s. Subjects who chose to contribute privately did in fact
2This conrms the predicted separating (Eq. 4) and pooling (Eq. 1) equilibria in [Ong, 2008a].
3"But outsiders or lower-level employees are seldom privy to the complex deliberations and the raft of
subjective judgments that go into the selection of the top people in any large, complex organization." See
[Loury, 1996].
4"...Consider diversity training.Texaco has pledged some $35 million for employee workshops on race
relations...I doubt that anyone astute enough to rise to the top of a major corporation really believes that
diversity workshops are the way to get blacks and whites to work together with mutual respect. But few
will now dare give candid expression to that view. Hiring a diversity consultant is a primary way for the
company to show its concern for minority sensibilities."[Loury, 1996][Eichenwald, 1996]
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contribute about $1.5. If we assume that nothing but beliefs was changed with an uninfor-
mative message, then the governing norm could not have changed. However, the propensity
to contribute $5 publicly did increase after the treatment.
The outline of the experiment follows. Data analysis is in section 3. The rationale of
the experiment is in Section 4. Possible issues with the experiment are addressed in Section
4.5. This is followed by the conclusion and appendices containing materials used for the
experiment. Appendix D contains a discussion of robustness checks.
2 Experimental Design
1. Advertisements for subjects with the heading, "Make $10 in 40 minutes," were placed
around campus and on Facebook.
2. Upon arrival, I read the Instructions and Consent of Appendix A to the subject
(Bobfor convenience) and walked him through the experiment.
3. Bob took a standard psychological test that measures guilt and shame sensitivity
(TOSCA-3), which contains 17 questions with 4 or 5 parts each that requires about
20 minutes to complete. Bob was told that the test was to predict his likely level of
generosity to Doctors Without Borders (DWB) a famous charity. I added a question
about Bobs major and whether he had contributed to DWB within the last year. There
were no other identiers. Bob scored his own test to maintain his anonymity.
4. Bob was then asked howmuch generousand ungeneroustypes of UCDavis students
would give of the $10 that they would earn from the experiment. See Appendix B for
the survey. The prior subject (Alicefor convenience) was called in from surng the
web to witness this. (The rst prior subject was a student confederate.)
5. If Bob was in the control group, he was told that a prediction based upon his test score
about his likely level of contribution would not be made. If Bob was in the treatment
group, he was told that a prediction would be made.
6. In the control group, Alice read out to Bob, Do you want to choose the private
option, where you can contribute whatever you like or contribute $5 here as you hand
in the test?.
7. In the treatment group, before Bob was given the choice between public or private
contribution in step 6, Alice asked Bob, Is your score below 438? If Bob said yes,
Alice then read out, According to our past experience, you are not likely to contribute
more than $2, if you choose the private option.He was then given the choice in step
6.
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8. Bob was paid either immediately before he was given the choice in steps 6 or 7, or
immediately after, in one case deviating from the order in the Instructions and Con-
sent. These constitute di¤erent treatments and are elaborated upon in Appendix D on
Robustness.
9. Bob followed through with his choice. If Bob chose the private option, he would walk
into room 109 next door, close the door and put whatever money he wanted to con-
tribute with his test into an envelope, and then, into a sealed box. Bob had been told
that the box would not be opened until at least three other subjects had done the same.
3 Results
As mentioned in part 8 directly above, each treatment involved an announcement and one of
two orders of payment. The signicant e¤ect in Treatment 2, where the choice of public or
private contribution occurred before payment suggests that the treatment e¤ect in Treatment
4, where the order was reversed, is unlikely to have been due to the order of payment alone.
Vice-versa for Treatment 2. See Appendix D on Robustness on these treatments for the
calculation of the likelihood that each treatment e¤ect occurred by chance. We have grounds
to regard the treatment e¤ect as being due to the announcement, made more or less e¤ective
by a particular order of payment, and to test for the statistical signicance of the combined
treatments.
3.0.1 Tests of Signicance for the Combined Treatments
There are two possible extreme null hypotheses:
1. H01 =all of the subjects were rational and cared only about money.
2. H02 =all subjects misunderstood the game and chose independently of the treatment.
In the case of H01, we do not need any formal statistics. It is rejected even if one subject
chose public contribution since it is monetarily dominated. H02 can be ruled out with the
Fishers Exact-Boschloo test.
Fishers Exact-Boschloo Test for All Treatments in both 2008 and 2009 The
Fishers Exact-Boschloo test is used when the scores from two independent random samples:
here treatment and control, all fall into one or the other of two mutually exclusive classes:
here public and private. See [Schlag, 2008] for more details on the Fishers Exact-Boschloo
test. Let N=number of subjects in the treatment.
5
N = 36 Public Private
Combined Treatments 10 16
Control 1 9
(Table 1)
The unconditional p-value5 or "the maximun probability under H01 of observing the test
statistic equal to or more extreme than the value observed in the data"[Berger, 1996] for
the two-tailed test is 0:0936: The case where only some of the subjects misunderstood the
game and chose public by accident (and therefore some other subjects chose public due the
treatment e¤ect), cannot be less signicant than 9%. Also, this level of signicance for all
treatments has to be regarded as a kind of lower bound on signicance for the most e¤ective
treatment.
4 Rationale for Experimental Design
4.1 Increasing Subjects Shame Sensitivity
TOSCA-3 asks subjects to imagine themselves in 17 scenarios in which they might feel shame.
I used this test to prime subjects for the possibility of shame, because in e¤ect, it asks subjects
to practice feeling ashamed in imagination. An example of a question from TOSCA-3:
Figure 1: TOSCA-3 questions.
According to the psychology literature, shame is due to beliefs about others beliefs [Tracy et. al, 2007]
that one has violated some norm or standard of behavior. Whatever shame Bob might feel
from taking the private option after Alice announces her belief that he will act ungenerously,
I tried to leveraged that shame further by the apparent scientic validity of that belief.
5See [Greenland, 1991] for the justication for the use of the unconditional p-value.
6I would like to thank Karl Schlag for making me aware of this test. See [Schlag, 2008] for his notes. See
[Berger, 2005] for the calculation software.
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Bob scored his own test to preserve his anonymity. The score was a weighted average
of test answers based on the hypothesis that generosity is correlated with guilt sensitivity.
The score was heavily weighted by the answer of an added question whether the subject
contributed to Doctors Without Borders (DWB) in the last year. The score was designed to
camouage the relationship between the numerical values of the answers and our prediction
for the subjects level of contribution, so as to make it less likely that the subject would try
to game the test (e.g., answer yes to the DWB question and be condent that we believed
that he would contribute generously when observed) and hence obviate the need to prove his
generosity by giving $5 publicly.
4.2 Establishing Norms of Generosity
On average, subjects estimated that the generous type would contribute more than $6 and the
ungenerous less than $1. See Table 1-6 below and Appendix C for the data. Bobs estimate
was intended to credibly establish the type space: generousand ungenerous, with respect
to which Bob could signal his own type (e.g., contribute more than the ungenerous type so
as to decrease the probability of being thought ungenerous). The accuracy of the prediction
did not matter for the experiment. What mattered was that Bob credibly committed himself
to a high and therefore costly (above $2) standard of generosity in front of Alice and the
experimenter. In fact, Alice, who may take a low estimate personally, was there in part to
bias Bobs estimate upwards.
4.3 The Choice Between Observable (Public) and Unobservable
(Private) Contributions
The public option of contributing $5 was restricted. Therefore, it was (monetarily) dominated
by the private option, where the subject could contribute $0-$10. However, unlike the private
option, it permitted the subject to make evident to observers that he was not the ungenerous
type. Hence, it may not be dominated if non-monetary payo¤s are taken into account.
4.4 Treatment
Alice only asked, Is your score below 438?instead of the actual score because that could
be used to identify Bob with his contribution, via his test which he put in the same envelope,
thus undermining the unobservedness of the private option. His score could only be above
that number if he contributed to DWB within the previous year. If he answered yes, Alice
read out to him, According to our past experience, you are not likely to contribute more
than $2, if you choose the private option7.This announcement of the expectation of low
7This estimate was gleened from past pilot experiments with other designs.
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contribution levels was designed to induce shame conditional on the private option being
taken. It played the same role as the drug rm representatives remark "One hand was the
other" in Fishy Gifts[Ong, 2008a], where reciprocation was shameful.
As mentioned in the experimental design, I varied the order of payment. See Appendix
D for the discussion.
4.5 Possible Problems with the Experiment
A number of the possible problems with this attempt to capture a shame spillover in the
laboratory can be ruled out by the data.
1. If subjects did not regard the private option as actually unobserved, then, contrary to
my actual results, there should not have been any signicant treatment e¤ect on the
probability with which subjects chose the private option.
2. If subjects did not think that their contribution would actually go to DWB, then
contrary to my results, they would only have chosen the private option and contributed
nothing.
3. There could have been shame in the private option even when subjects were untreated.
This shame would not explain the change in behavior when subjects were treated.
4. The public contribution could be due to a self-image preference. However, the subjects
in the control group, those who were not treated with the announcement of observers
beliefs, did not mind taking the private option and making a low contribution. Pre-
sumably, subjects self image is independent of an announcement of observersbeliefs
about what a subject will do when unobserved.
5. There is the possibility that Bobs choice was not entirely independent of Alices since
Alice read out the prediction to Bob. However, the monetary payo¤s of Bobs choices
were fully revealed. Therefore, Alice could only have communicated her beliefs about
Bob in her announcement. The e¤ect of this belief, i.e., shame, was what was being
tested for. For that purpose, it didnt matter that Alice had been a prior subject.
Thus, though the prior subject read out the prediction for the current subject, the
independence assumption necessary for the Fishers Exact-Boschloo test still applies.
6. Subjects could have also guessed the motive of the experiment to induce shame that
required a costly action of the public contribution of $5 to avoid. In that case, they
wouldnt have contributed anything and their TOSCA score would have been unusual,
contrary to my data.
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7. One could argue that the treatment e¤ect was due to experimenter demand. However,
the announcement was only about the beliefs of the experimenter and not about the
experimenters preferences. The subject could have been responding to his preferences
over the beliefs of the experimenter, but that is what is being tested for.
8. Some of the instructions were unclear. For example, the subject was not told what
would happen if there were not 3 other subjects who made private contributions. No
one asked and I did not explain how or why a psychological test would be used to
predict a subjects level of generosity. I did not try to dispel these ambiguities due
to time or budget constraints or because I didnt want the subject to think too much
about the experiment. In any case, confusion should lead to greater randomness in
lower signicance levels.
5 Conclusion
The results of the above experiments suggest that the shame spillovers from scandals can
sort people out of duciary-like positions. The correlation between shame and guilt as mea-
sured by TOSCA-3 is estimated at 0.5 [Tangney and Dearing, 2002]. If people were being
sorted by shame sensitivity, they would also be sorted out by guilt sensitivity. Experimental
results from trust games like [Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006] suggested that some notion
of "guilt" increases reciprocation of trust. Together, they suggest that those most likely to
be trustworthy are also most likely to be sorted out of duciary position by a scandal. Then,
not only would scandals damage the eld, the damage to the reputation of the eld would
select for people who would further damage the eld. President Obamas shaming of Wall
Street employees [Stolberg and Labaton, 2009][Segal, 2009] could therefore have exactly the
opposite e¤ect from what he intended.
But, even without a scandal, duciary positions should attract the least trustworthy
people because they have the most to gain or least to lose from betraying trust. According
to Raymond W. McDaniel of Moodys[McDonald, 2008]:
The real problem is not that the market . . . underweight[s] ratings quality but
rather that in some sectors, it actually penalizes quality. . . . It turns out that
ratings quality has surprisingly few friends: issuers want high ratings; investors
dont want ratings downgrades; short-sighted bankers labor short-sightedly to
game the ratings agencies.McDaniel then tells his board: Unchecked, compe-
tition on this basis can place the entire nancial system at risk.Furthermore,
though Moodys has erected safeguards to keep teams from too easily solving the
market share problem by lowering standards. This does NOT solve the problem.
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Given this problem of adverse selection into duciary professions, how is it possible that
duciary professions function at all? What institutional measures exist to counteract the
adverse selection to duciary elds? In [Ong 2008b], I model how institutional arrangements
in duciary professions, like pro-bono work, can save the reputation of a eld by sorting
people who might exploit trust out of the eld.
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5.1 Appendix A: Instructions and Consent
This experiment will proceed as follows:
1. You will be asked to take a standard psychological test of 17 questions that we
will use to estimate your likely level of generosity to Doctors Without Borders (DWB), an
organization which brings western doctors to parts of the world where medical care is urgently
needed but not available.
2. To preserve anonymity, you will score your own test using an Excel spreadsheet.
Write down your score on the piece of paper provided, but do not show it to us. Then close
the spreadsheet without saving.
3. Before another UCD student, you will be asked to state an estimate of how much,
a. a generous type of UCD student would give of the $10 that they earn to DWB.
b. an ungenerous type of UCD student would give of the $10 that they earn to DWB.
4. After you make your estimate, you will be paid $10 and asked to sign for it. After
you sign for it, the money is yours.
5. Then, you will be given the opportunity to donate $5 when you hand in the test,
or any amount you think appropriate anonymously in room 109. If you take the anonymous
option, please put the test and the money in the envelope provided. A receipt from Doctors
Without Borders for the cumulative amount of money will be posted on the web at the end
of the experiment in a few weeks.
6. Before you contribute, we may or may not score your test and inform you of how
much you are likely to contribute should you choose the anonymous option. If we score your
test, the previous participant will read you the prediction.
7. This test is anonymous. There is nothing to identify you with your contribution
or your test score. For the purpose of the experiment, we will only record your major. For
the purpose of paying you, we will keep a receipt of your guess and the fact that we paid
you. You will be asked to stay until the next participant makes their choice. That way, you
can also be sure that the box remains unopened, thus preserving your anonymity. We would
not open the box until at least 3 participants have taken the anonymous option.
I understand these instructions and would like to participate in the experiment
Name______________________________
Signature______________________________Date_____________
5.2 Appendix B: Experimental Subjects Predictions
Circle your estimate of the average contribution of generous people.
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$0
$1
$2
$3
$4
$5
$6
$7
$8
$9
$10
Circle your estimate of the average contribution of not generous people.
5.3 Appendix C: Data
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6
Religion Christian Buddhist Atheist None None Catholic
Estimate: Generous 5 5 1 5 10 5
Estimate: Not Generous 0 0 0 0 2 0
Guilt Sensitivity 66 72 60 62 59 54
Shame Sensitivity 44 49 45 48 54 25
Informed Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Public No No No No No No
Contribution 6 0 10 5 4 3
(Table 4: Data from Treatment 1 (August 2008).)
Subject 1 2 3 4 5
Estimate: Generous 10 10 5 5 5
Estimate: Not Generous 3 0 2 0 0
Guilt Sensitivity 52 57 68 64 59
Shame Sensitivity 54 49 42 57 46
Informed Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Public No No No No No
Contribution 3 3 0 3 0
(Table 5: Data from Treatment 3 (August 2008))
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Subject 1 2 3 4 5
Religion None
Estimate: Generous 6 5 5 5 6
Estimate: Not Generous 0 0 2 0 0
Guilt Sensitivity 54 64 56 50 67
Shame Sensitivity 41 37 41 27 41
Informed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public Yes No Yes No Yes
Contribution 5 1 5 2 5
(Table 6: Data from Treatment 4 (August 2008))
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Estimate: Generous 7 5 10 10 3 6 5 5 6
Estimate: Not Generous 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1
Guilt Sensitivity 67 59 67 71 66 68 70 56 47
Shame Sensitivity 49 28 53 46 52 57 55 43 47
Treated Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Public N N N Y N N N N N
Contribution 5 0 0 5 0 3 0 X 5
(Table 6: Data From Treatment 2 (April 2009))
Subject 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Av
Estimate: Generous 10 5 7 3 7 10 8 3 6.5
Estimate: Not Generous 0 0 2 0 0 3 1 0 0.5
Guilt Sensitivity 45 60 61 45 67 58 67 61 61
Shame Sensitivity 32 43 45 33 55 47 46 48 46
Treated N N N N Y Y Y Y
Public N N Y N Y Y N N
Contribution 0 2 5 0 5 5 X X 2.1
(Table 7: Data From Treatment 2 (April 2009))
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6 Appendix D: Robustness: Variations in the Treat-
ment
6.0.1 Treatment 1: TOSCA-3 with Subject Identied by Religion
My original modied TOSCA-3 included an identier for the religion of the subject. Average
contributions levels jumped from $2 in pilot experiments8 to $5. There was also signicant
negative correlation between guilt and contribution levels. See rst four columns of Table 4 in
Appendix C. These unexpected results would still be predicted by a treatment of my model in
[Ong, 2008a], developed further in [Ong 2008b]. Some subjects who belonged to religions that
were not known for generosity may have wanted to contribute more because they wanted to
make their religion look better to the experimenter or the audience of the paper. For example
the atheist contributed $10 and wrote that the religion was strongly atheist. Others may be
content to free-ride on the good reputation of their religion (e.g., the Buddhist gave $0). The
negative correlation between the guilt of the subject and contribution level would make sense
if the low guilt people sorted into less charitable religions and hence, were more burdened
with shame. However, I wanted to focus on sorting by shame alone. I decided to drop the
religion question and restart. After getting the major result of the experiment discussed
above in Table 2 below, I decided to do further experiments with surveys that included the
religion question to see if I could show that it indeed made a signicant di¤erence to the
level of contributions. But, upon subsequent trials, the contribution level went down and the
negative correlation disappeared. See columns 5-7 of Table 4.
6.0.2 Treatment 2: Surprise Reversal of Order
When I restarted the experiment, my rst Alice read out the choice between public or private
contribution before I could pay my rst Bob, contrary to the lines 4 and 5 of the instructions
(See Appendix A.). There was a noticeable change in Bobs level of agitation at the choice
of public or private. I took the fact that he also chose the public option as signicant. I
decided to keep that order reversal for all 7 subsequent subjects that week, both treated and
untreated, so information was still the only thing that varied across subjects. This is the
data in table 2 below.
8I made some major changes to the experiment after presenting the results of a set of pilot experiments
at a departmental brownbag. Among them was the inclusion of a question about the subjects religion in the
modied TOSCA-3.
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Treatment 2 (September 2008) Average
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Estimate: Generous 10 2 7 9 10 10 9 3 7:5
Estimate: Not Generous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guilt Sensitivity 64 63 65 58 72 48 51 70 61
Shame Sensitivity 47 58 52 59 66 45 48 57 54
Treated Y Y Y Y N N N N
Public Y Y Y Y N N N N
Contribution 5 5 5 5 2 2 1 1 3:3
(Table 2)
All 4 subjects of the treatment group chose the public option of contributing $5. All 4
subjects of the control group chose the private option and gave less than $2.
Fishers Exact-Boschloo Test for Treatment 2 (August 2008 Rounds)
N = 8 Public Private
Treatment 4 0
Control 0 4
(Table 3)
The p-value was 2.8%. Note that this result is not categorically better than Treatment 4,
where there was no change in order, but 3/5 subjects chose the monetarily dominated option
of giving in public. The level of signicance there was 16%.
Several reasons come to mind as to why I could now get 100% treatment from the change
in order between lines 4 and 5:
1. The change in order diminished the endowment e¤ect, which would have made the
subject want to keep more of the money, countering the e¤ect of shame, which would
have made the subject want to seem generous by giving away more money.
2. The strong e¤ect was due to the change in order only but not the surprise. Under
this hypothesis, the payment would not intervene between the admission of the subject
that generosity required contributions greater than $5 and the announcement that the
subject was not likely to give more than $2 The lack of e¤ect in Treatment 3, where
there was a change in order but no surprise, suggests the unlikeliness of this possibility.
3. The surprise change in order could have intensied the e¤ect of shame. If so, this may
be why I was able to measure the e¤ect of shame even though there was only two
observers (the experimenter and Alice). [Tadelis, 2007] used at least 10 observers to
get his e¤ect.
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4. The deviation could have suggested the possibility of further deviations in the subjects
mind, e.g., that he risked not being paid at all if he chose the private option. In the
advertisements for subject, they were promised $10 in 40 minutes for taking a survey
and splitting some money. They also signed a consent which explicitly said that they
would be paid. In this context, non-payment would be such a breach of professionalism
that its hard to imagine that any subject could entertain that possibility.
6.0.3 Comparing Treatment 2 in 2009 to 2008
I did 14 more subjects in 2009 (See Table 6 and 7 in Appendix C for the data.) to try to
corroborate Treatment 2 (for a total of 36 subjects9 for all treatments for all years). There was
a decrease of $1.2 for Treatment 2 from $3.3 (2008) to $2.1 (2009) in the average contribution
level of subject. Average shame sensitivity, as measured by TOSCA 3, went down by 15%,
which suggests that the subjects could have been di¤erent. The decrease in contribution level
would be predicted if belief preferences were contingent on wealth and wealth was expected
to be lower due to the intervening nancial crisis. Nonetheless, the level of signicance was
still greater than the other treatments, excluding Treatment 2.
6.0.4 Treatment 3: Reversal of Order But No Surprise
To test whether the reversal of order between line 4 and 5 alone in Appendix A, as opposed
to the reversal order and the surprise deviation from instructions was responsible for the
perfect correlation, I removed line 4, After you make your estimate, you will be paid $10
and asked to sign for it. After you sign for it, the money is yours.from the Instructions and
Consentform in Appendix A and merely paid subjects after they made their choice. Then,
0=4 subjects who were in the treatment group chose the public option, though one subject
took about 20 seconds to make his choice. See Table 5 in Appendix C. Thus, it became less
plausible that reversal of order alone increased the probability of the choice of the public
option.
6.0.5 Treatment 4: No Reversal of Order
The unimportance of the mere reversal of order of lines 4 and 5 in Treatment 3 without
surprise and that in Treatment 2 with surprise was further conrmed when I re-established
the original order. Then, 3/5 of subjects chose the public option. See Table 6 in Appendix C.
The increase in those who chose public suggests that the strong treatment e¤ect in Treatment
2 was due either to the surprise or to both the surprise and reversal of order. More data is
necessary to make an rm conclusion.
9I lost access to the rooms for this experiment after these subjects and was only able to regain it in spring
2009.
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N = 9 Public Private
Treatment 3 2
Control 0 4
As mentioned above, the p-value for this treatment was 16:7%.
6.0.6 All Treatments from 2008
The nancial crisis occurred between my rounds of experiments. The ensuing changes in
average wealth could make it less shameful to be ungenerous. Thus, it may be good to
separate the data from before the crisis to after.
If all of 22 subjects of the treatments in 2008 were pooled and called one experiment, the
result would be close to being signicant at the 10% level for the two tail test10:
N = 22 Public Private
Treatment 7 9
Control 0 6
The p-value was 12% for the two tailed test[?].
6.0.7 Excluded Data from 2009
The structure of the lab is not ideally suited for this experiment. In the 2009 experiments,
Subject 8 saw 7s choice of public or private. Subject 17s arrival interrupted 16s choice of
public or private. Subject 17 placed his score in full view after being told that he should hide
it, perhaps in an e¤ort to inform observers of his level of generosity, without having to signal
with the costly choice of the $5 public contribution. Xs in the contribution box of Table 9
stand for "excluded" from the analysis.
10The total of all treatments in Table 1 was calclated by adding the 14 subjects from 2009 to the 22 subjects
from 2008.
N = 37 Public Private
Treatment 7 + 3 9 + 7
Control 0 + 1 6 + 3
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